The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 52
Number 2 Volume 52, Number 2 Summer Issue

Article 15

Summer 5-18-2022

Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media
Alexander G. Lovelace

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons,
Military History Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and
Public Administration Commons, Political History Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Strategic
Management Policy Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Alexander G. Lovelace, "Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media," Parameters 52, no. 2 (2022): 117-134,
doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3156.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Lessons from History

Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media
Alexander G. Lovelace

©2022 Alexander G. Lovelace

ABSTRACT: Distilling lessons from the author’s book, The Media Offensive:
How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, this
article provides applicable suggestions for the US military today. As in World
War II, the press is both a weapon and a possible vulnerability in modern warfare.
Consequently, this article offers practical suggestions for how the press can be
used by public affairs officers, commanders, and policymakers to achieve victory in
coming conflicts.
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ieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. began a November 6, 1944, press
conference by asking the assembled reporters for a favor. The purpose of
the press conference was to brief the correspondents on the Third Army’s
coming offensive to capture Metz, France. Patton asked if the BBC correspondent
was present and explained “you can do me a very great favor by lying for me when
we attack by saying we are straightening our lines for a winter position.” He hoped
the deception would gain his army 24 hours. Other reporters reminded the general
their stories were also broadcast on the radio, and Patton agreed they could help.1
Major General Hobart Gay, the Third Army’s deputy chief of staff, recorded that
Patton “gave them practically all the details of the proposed attack.” Gay added
“the purpose of this statement is to mislead the enemy and not the public.”2 Patton
had an additional request, “Another thing is to give the Corps, Division, and
Regimental Commanders credit for what they do.” Giving individuals or specific units’
publicity would uplift the morale of both soldiers and civilians. After reminding the
reporters that everything he had told them was secret, he ended by saying “I know
I can trust you.”3
Seventy-seven years later in the early morning hours of May 14, 2021 ( Jerusalem
time), the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) announced “air and ground troops are currently
attacking in the Gaza Strip.” Hamas reacted by ordering their ground forces into
a maze of defensive tunnels to repel the assault. No ground attack came. Instead, the
Israeli Air Force subjected the tunnels to 40 minutes of bombardment. Meanwhile,
the IDF corrected their statement. No ground attack was afoot. Only artillery
1. “Conference between General Patton and Third Army Correspondents,” November 6, 1944, folder 7, box 53,
George S. Patton Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.
2. Hobart R. Gay, Diary, November 6, 1944, folder October 7, 1944 to November 20, 1944, box 2, Hobart R. Gay
Papers, US Army Heritage and Education Center.
3. “General Patton and Third Army Correspondents.”
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fire from outside Gaza, which, in the fog of war, had been misinterpreted as a
ground invasion. Despite the IDF denial, the international media were outraged
and claimed the military had deliberately used the press to mislead Hamas into
their crosshairs.4 Whatever the truth, the erroneous report had worked to Israel’s
tactical advantage.
As the above examples demonstrate, the press has played a role in past conflicts
and will continue to be an important factor in future wars. Although the two
stories have notable differences, they also contain striking similarities. With
changing technologies and the onset of social media and content apps (such as
TikTok), the press’s role in warfare continues to grow.
In my forthcoming book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public
Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, I argue the onset of total war
made World War II combatants attempt to use the press as a weapon.5 At the
same time, press and public opinion increasingly influenced the battlefield
decisions of commanders. In this article, I argue that both observations are
valid today, explore how lessons from the World War II media war can guide
future conflicts, address perennial issues in military media situations (not function
as a critique of current US Army public affairs policies), and provide lessons drawn
from history while acknowledging the vastly different media landscape that has
emerged since World War II.
For this article, the definitions of what is “news” and “public opinion” have
been left deliberately opaque. Most people, military officers included, do not
have a formal definition for either term, but view where they get information on
current events as news. Public opinion can be in the eye of the beholder. As this
article shows, what an officer believes news and public opinion to be is more
significant for explaining his or her actions than what news and public opinion
actually are.

News Will Influence Battlefield Decisions
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ernest King, and George Marshall were hardly
publicity hounds. During World War II, however, they allowed their military
decisions to be influenced by the media as much as limelight-loving Mark Clark,
4. David M. Halbfinger, “A Press Corps Deceived, and the Gaza Invasion That Wasn’t,” New York
Times (website), May 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/middleeast/israel-gaza
-disinformation.html?msclkid=5baa82afcd2f11eca81f0bc36e6545ae; Josef Federman, “Israeli Military
Accused of Using Media to Trick Hamas,” Associated Press (website), May 15, 2021, https://apnews.com
/article/hamas-middle-east-israel-media-4d942411c64c8ae1e919ae93401f8919?msclkid=a6766017cd2f11ec9
ddf42856dde7cd1; Nir Dvori, “The IDF’s Ploy: This Is How the Tunnels Became Death Traps for
Terrorists in Gaza,” N12 (website), May 14, 2021, https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/2021_q2/Article
-178966f b8e96971026.htm?sCh=31750a2610f26110&pId=173113802.
5. Alexander G. Lovelace, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy
during World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2022).
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Douglas MacArthur, and George Patton. As Francis de Guingand, Bernard Law
Montgomery’s chief of staff, wrote after the war, “It is well that the press should
realise how even the most dogged and determined characters are influenced by
what they say.”6
Even strong-willed commanders who ignore the press will have to answer
to military and political leaders who do the opposite. As Saddam Hussein’s
forces retreated from Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War, for example, they
were caught in the open by the US Air Force. The press labeled the subsequent
destruction the “Highway of Death.” It did not take long before coalition
commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf heard his superiors were beginning
to worry public opinion might be negatively affected by the graphic images.
Schwarzkopf concluded, “Washington was ready to overreact, as usual, to the
slightest ripple in public opinion. I thought, but didn’t say, that the best thing
the White House could do would be to turn off the damned TV in the situation
room.”7 Clearly, the press is a weapon that cuts both ways and understanding how
the media influences military decision making is a necessary precursor to wielding
the media as a weapon.
During World War II, overseas commanders rarely had access to editorials,
opinion polls, or timely news.8 However, this lack of access did not stop them from
guessing what public opinion was and responding accordingly. For example, near
the end of the North African campaign in spring 1943 the British announced
logistical problems prevented British and American forces from taking part in
the final battle for Tunisia and explained they would take the Axis surrender.
Major General Omar Bradley, who commanded the US II Corps, visited
Eisenhower to complain. Bradley told Eisenhower, “The people in the United
States want a victory and they deserve one,” Bradley argued. “After playing
an important part on the North African invasion and in the early Tunisian
campaign, they would find it difficult to understand why the American forces were
squeezed out in this final campaign.”9 Instead of inquiring how Bradley knew
public opinion so conveniently supported his argument, Eisenhower changed
the battle plans to include the II Corps. In this case, as in others, perception of
public opinion mattered more than its reality.
6. Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 381–82.
7. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: The Autobiography of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
(New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 468.
8. Eisenhower to Charles Kenon Gailey Jr., January 1, 1943, letter, in Dwight Eisenhower, The Papers of
Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 2, The War Years, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1970), 883; Dwight Eisenhower to Edgar Eisenhower, February 18, 1943, letter, in Dwight D. Eisenhower,
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 1, The War Years, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. (Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970), 962; and Eisenhower to Alexander Day Surles, April 6, 1943, letter, in Eisenhower
Papers, vol. 2, 1081.
9. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Random House, 1951), 56–59.
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Today, social media provides a new pressure—and danger—of influencing
commanders and policymakers. Although it is easy to equate social media and
public opinion, they are not the same. A 2019 Pew study of Twitter found
22 percent of American adults who have a Twitter account are more likely to
be young, highly educated, wealthy, women, and vote for Democrats. A more
stunning fact is that 10 percent of Twitter users are responsible for 80 percent of all
the tweets created. Additionally, the study observed, “Individuals who are among
the top 10 percent most active tweeters also differ from those who tweet rarely
in ways that go beyond the volume of content they produce . . . Compared
with other US adults on Twitter, they are much more likely to be women and
more likely to say they regularly tweet about politics.”10 More significant is
the size of this group. With 22 percent of the US adult population, the group
numbered 56,153,082 in 2019.11 Ten percent of this number means 5,615,309
people made 80 percent of all the tweets on Twitter. This number is hardly
insignificant, but when it is compared to the US adult population of 255,241,278,
it is not impressive. Twitter activity may represent something, but it does not
represent American public opinion.
The real power of Twitter is not so much the number of people that post, but
the power they have to drive news stories. Indeed, Twitter and other social media
sites have provided politicians, business leaders, and others with a platform that
bypasses traditional news outlets. Tweets can be picked up by different news
sources and have much wider influence than they would have on Twitter.12 These
posts, however, come from already-famous users who could attract media attention
without Twitter. In addition, this group is much smaller than the 2 percent of the
population that creates most tweets. At best, Twitter shows the opinions of the
elite who post and should not be mistaken for public opinion.
Enemy actors can also use social media to create public pressure to end a war,
amplify domestic unrest, create disinformation, highlight rumors, and spread
havoc. The use of fake or stolen social media accounts by the Chinese and Russian

10. Stefan Wojcik and Adam Hughes, “Sizing Up Twitter Users,” April 24, 2019, Pew Research Center
(website), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/04/24/sizing-up-twitter-users/; and Mason Walker
and Katerina Eva Matsa, “News Consumption across Social Media in 2021,” September 20, 2021, Pew
Research Center (website), https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/09/20/news-consumption-across
-social-media-in-2021/.
11. “Total Population by Child and Adult Populations in the United States,” Annie E. Casey Foundation
Kids Count Data Center (website), accessed January 4, 2022, https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables
/ 99-total-population-by-child-and-adult-populations#detailed/ 1/any/false/574,1729,37,871,870,573,869,36,
868,867/39,40,41/416,417.
12. Walker and Matsa, “News Consumption across Social Media.”
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governments is well documented.13 One 2021 study found that “[a] coordinated
influence operation on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube is using a mix of fake
and repurposed accounts to push pro-China narratives and distort perceptions
on important issues.”14 The same report estimated Chinese influence operations
employed between 40 to 55 Facebook accounts, 300 to 500 Twitter accounts,
and 12 YouTube accounts.15 In other words, opinion gleaned from anecdotal
social media posts no more represents public opinion than the anonymous notes
Shakespeare’s Cassius left for Brutus to find to convince him the masses wished
him to save Rome from Caesar.16
While commanders cannot always avoid letting public opinion influence
battlefield decisions, they should exercise careful judgment over what is public
opinion, what they assume is public opinion, and what is a loud minority or enemy
disinformation.

Today’s Media Is Different from the World War II Press
In 1987, journalists Peter Jennings and Mike Wallace participated in a
discussion about combat ethics. The moderator asked Jennings what he would do
if he were covering a hypothetical enemy unit preparing to ambush US soldiers.
Jennings responded he would do everything in his power to warn the Americans.
Wallace disagreed asserting, “I am astonished, really, to hear Peter say that.
You’re a reporter. Granted you are an American. But you are a reporter
covering combat . . . and I am a little bit at a loss to understand why, because
you are an American, you would not cover that story.” The moderator asked if
Wallace did not have a higher duty “as an American citizen” to save the lives of
his country’s soldiers. Wallace replied he did not, and at this point, Jennings
had changed his mind as well.17
Four years later, Saddam Hussein apparently had no more qualms about
allowing an American news outlet to cover the Persian Gulf War from Baghdad
than CNN had in providing the coverage. A few days after the United States
began bombing Afghanistan in October 2001, National Public Radio’s senior
13. Insikt Group, “Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion,”
March 6, 2019, https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2019-0306.pdf; Marcel Schliebs et al.,
“China’s Inauthentic UK Twitter Diplomacy: A Coordinated Network Amplifying PRC Diplomats,”
The Programme on Democracy & Technology, University of Oxford; and Nina Jankowicz and Ross Burley,
“The West Has Gotten Savvier about Russian Disinformation. Will That Help Ukraine?” Washington Post,
January 22, 2022.
14. Benjamin Strick, Analysis of the Pro-China Propaganda Network Targeting International Narratives (Centre
for Information Resilience, 2021), 4.
15. Strick, “Pro-China Propaganda,” 4.
16. William Shakespeare, “Julius Caesar,” in The Works of William Shakespeare Complete (New York: Black’s
Readers Service Company, New York, 1937), 1.2.310. Referenced to act, scene, and line.
17. “Jennings & Wallace, Reporters First, Americans Second,” YouTube, video, 3:54, July 10, 2006,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGg_dpGhlf0; and James Fallows, “Why We Hate the Media,” Frontline
(website), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/press/vanities/fallows.html.
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foreign editor Loren Jenkins was asked about the ethics of reporting the secret
positions of US military units. Jenkins did noy hesitate in responding he would
expose the units’ positions, explaining “I don’t represent the government.
I represent history, information, what happened.”18
Such attitudes stand in stark contrast to those of the American press
during World War II. When discussing the soldier-slapping scandal that
might hurt or end Patton’s contribution to the war effort, Demaree Bess of the
Saturday Evening Post spoke for a different generation of reporters when he
explained “we’re Americans first and correspondents second.”19 The 60 journalists
in the theater apparently agreed, and the story was only broken months later by
a stateside commentator.20 The Vietnam War, combined with Watergate, made
the press much less trusting of government authority. Likewise, large media
corporations followed the trend of other international businesses within the
United States in seeing themselves as transcending national boundaries.21
More importantly, technology has fundamentally transformed the
news business in terms of speed, accessibility, and who can influence news.
Television changed who in news organizations influences editorial opinion.
During the first half of the twentieth century, newspaper editorials were
largely shaped by editors, media company presidents, and shareholders.
The television format gave reporters greater latitude in interpreting the meaning
of news.22 Years later, the need to fill the 24-hour cable news cycle added to
the increased focus on opinion shows and the competitiveness of journalism.
At the same time, the proliferation of new outlets, including online news, has
amplified the use of opinion over facts in reporting. A 2019 RAND Corporation
empirical study comparing broadcast television to cable news found post2000 cable news coverage “exhibited a dramatic and quantifiable shift toward
subjective, abstract, directive, and argumentative language and content based more
on the expression of opinion than on reporting of events.”
The same study compared print and online journalism between 2012 and 2017
and found online journalism tended to be “more argumentative, with an eye toward
persuasion.”23 While older news models focused on trying to attract the largest
audiences possible through objectivity, the RAND study found the opposite
18. Steve Johnson, “Cutting through ‘The Fog of War’,” Chicago Tribune (website), October 12, 2001,
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-10-12-0110120007-story.html?.
19. Quentin Reynolds, By Quentin Reynolds (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 296.
20. Virgil Pinkley with James F. Scheer, Eisenhower Declassified (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell
Company, 1979), 160.
21. Jeff Jacoby, “Patriotism and the CEOs,” Boston Globe, July 30, 1998, A15.
22. Paul Johnson, A History of the American People (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), 846–47.
23. Jennifer Kavanagh et al., News In A Digital Age: Comparing the Presentation of News Information over
Time and across Media Platforms (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), xvii–xviii, https://www
.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2900/RR2960/RAND_RR2960.pdf.
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trend to be true today. As news became increasingly opinionated, it also became
more partisan and led to fragmentation.24 There are more ways to get news than
ever before, but with each outlet reaching smaller audiences. It is uncertain how
much TikTok and social media platforms will continue to wrest control of news
content from professional journalists. Real philosophical, technological, and
structural differences, therefore, exist between the World War II press and the
media today.
Given the press’s hostile attitude, it might be tempting to advocate some form
of censorship. If censorship saves military lives, would not the American public
come to demand it? World War II censorship methods today, however, are as
untenable as they are undesirable. During World War II, the military controlled
the means of communicating written and broadcast news to the American
people, which often took time and allowed for prepublication censorship. The
advent of the Internet, live coverage, satellites, and other technological advances
makes anything approaching World War II censorship impossible. News is no
longer the sole domain of professional journalists. Censoring every blog or Twitter
account would prove very difficult.
Despite these changes of the press in outlook and technology, World War II
can still impart important lessons for the military leadres who are dealing with
today’s press. To begin with, commanders during that conflict were working
with new forms of media (such as newsreels and radio) and the increasing speed
of information. As Eisenhower discovered, modern communications meant the
“commander in the field is never more than an hour away from home capitals
and public opinion.”25 Nor was the World War II press nearly as subservient
to the military as supposed.26 Commanders had to deal with scandals, mistakes,
and reporters hostile to the military. Finally, the basic task of reporters has not
changed, nor has the power of news to shape warfare.

The Press Is a Weapon
Fortunately, there are less draconian and more effective ways than censorship for
the press to contribute to victory. To start, the military should establish channels
to major news organizations long before any conflict begins to create trust and
provide a way for dangerous or false new stories to be blocked or managed. After
heavy criticism of the US military’s agreement to allow Vichy French officials
24. Kavanagh et al., News in a Digital Age, 8–9.
25. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 184.
26. Steven Casey, The War Beat, Europe: The American Media at War against Nazi Germany (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 3, 347, 352; Richard A. Fine, “ ‘Snakes in Our Midst’: The Media, the
Military and American Policy toward Vichy North Africa,” American Journalism 27 no. 4 (2010): 59–82;
and Richard A. Fine, “Edward Kennedy’s Long Road to Reims: The Media and the Military in
World War II,” American Journalism 33, no. 3 (2016): 317–39.
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to retain power temporarily in North Africa in exchange for keeping order,
journalist Alexander F. Jones of the Washington Post helped establish a committee
with the American Society of Newspaper Editors to work with the military to
get more accurate angles on controversial stories.27 A modern equivalent could
help prevent needless scandals while fostering greater understanding between
soldiers and reporters.
The best public relations officers during World War II tended to be former
reporters, or at least officers who were somewhat sympathetic towards
journalism. Due to the massive growth of the US Army during the war, most
high-level commanders had at least one former reporter on their personal staffs
to facilitate contact between both groups and help commanders understand
the needs of journalists. Although direct recruitment of professional journalists
would be difficult, today’s public affairs officers should have some experience or
training as journalists to help meet the needs of both the military and reporters.
Initiatives such as the PAO Program, which provides public affairs officers with
additional training in journalism schools, is an excellent start.
Lessons learned from World War II led to the creation of the Defense
Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), which continues to cultivate
goodwill with journalists.28 Before D-Day, Allied public relations officers
compiled a massive library of photos and information to be made available
to fill the incredible demand for news the landing in France would generate.29
Journalists sympathetic to both the military and their profession, such as
CBS’s Edward R. Murrow, worked as liaisons between news organizations and
military officers planning press accommodations.30 Modern news driven by
constant television and online media will continue to need the important service
DVIDS provides.
Directing organized media attention toward ordinary soldiers, which the
US military has done successfully in recent wars, also has its origins during
World War II. For example, Patton tried—not always successfully—to direct
media attention away from himself and toward his soldiers. He wrote the head
of War Department Public Relations, stating “It is my opinion that in spite of
our large conversation about the psychology of war, we utterly fail to utilize the
27. Jones to Butcher, November 30, 1942, letter, folder November 30, 1942 to January 7, 1943 (2), box 166,
Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916–52, Principal File, Eisenhower President Library,
Kansas.
28. “DVIDS,” Defense Media Activity (website), https://www.dma.mil/Services/DVIDS/, accessed
April 16, 2022.
29. “Final Report on Invasion Reference Library,” June 9, 1944, folder 314.7, box 7, RG 331, National
Archives Annex, College Park, MD.
30. Lynne Olson, Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour
(New York: Random House, 2010), 317.
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simplest means of stimulating pride and valor in the troops.”31 Patton took for
granted that the names of commanders and units would already be known to the
enemy, and thus there was no harm in criticizing or praising them in the press.
He argued:
if the people at home know that the boys from Lensville [sic],
Illinois or Junction City Kansas are fighting and doing well, they will
get a great kick out of it and will write to the soldiers with the result
that the soldiers will fight harder than ever. If, on the other hand, they
learn that certain units have not done well, they will also write, and
these units will do better.32

As Patton stated during a press conference in 1944, stories of individual
heroism “are the things we should get to the people at home and they would
have a tremendous uplifting influence on the people and on the soldiers.”33
Eisenhower agreed, concluding “no thing . . . so improves the morale of the
soldier as to see his unit or his own name in print—just once.”34 He made an
effort to have his photo taken with ordinary GIs and then had the pictures sent
to their hometown newspapers.35 By the end of the war in Europe, the US Army
had formed bands of war correspondents who interviewed ordinary soldiers and
sent the stories to hometown newspapers.36 At the peak of the program, nearly
20,000 stories were sent home each week. One reporter recalled that “I’ve met
soldiers who’d show me well-worn clippings about some story I’d written about
them months before.”37
Today, as in World War II, accounts of ordinary soldiers make excellent
news stories. Although news—particularly hometown newspapers—is different
than during World War II such stories provide journalists with an inexhaustible
supply of exciting and appealing articles.38 It was no accident that Ernie Pyle
became the most famous war correspondent of World War II by writing almost
exclusively about ordinary GIs. These stories are limited when it comes to the
larger context of the conflict, and they cannot help the war effort.
Commanders should take every opportunity to bring public attention to
their subordinates and staff. The US Army released few division or regimental
31. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945, vol. 2 (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1974), 101.
32. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 101.
33. “Conference between General Patton and Third Army Correspondents,” November 6, 1944, folder 7,
box 53, George S. Patton Papers.
34. Barney Oldfield, Never A Shot in Anger (New York; Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), xii.
35. Patton, diary, June 26, 1944, folder 5, box 3, George S. Patton Papers.
36. Unpublished Lawrence memoir, page 219, folder Memoirs-World War II (2), box 2 Justus Baldwin
Lawrence Papers.
37. Unpublished Lawrence memoir, page 219,
38. Tom Curley and John Maxwell Hamilton, introduction, in Julia Kennedy Cochran, ed., Ed Kennedy’s
War: V-E Day, Censorship, & the Associated Press (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), xi.
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commander’s names to the press through most of World War II. Patton and
other commanders spent a lot of time trying to get the policy changed in order
to highlight their hard work and successes.39 When Marshall visited him in fall
1944, Patton startled the chief of staff by facetiously saying the wife of one of his
generals wanted a divorce. When Marshall offered to intervene, Patton replied
that the only thing he could do was release the general’s name to the press
because his wife thought her husband was a slacker. Patton got his general’s
name in the press but remembered belatedly that Marshall had “no sense of
humor.”40 Nevertheless, such actions built loyal and highly motivated subordinates.
Conversely, generals such as Clark and MacArthur created lasting resentment by
failing to spread praise in the press about their officers and men.41
Directing media attention toward the officers and soldiers one commands is
good press policy and one of the basics of leadership. One reason for the success
of “embedded” journalists during the Iraq War was the focus it placed on ordinary
soldiers. American troops are not saints, and there will also be stories that reflect
badly on the US military. Nevertheless, the best public affairs specialist is the
American soldier in combat. Commanders should remember two additional
points. First, troops performing vital work (such as logistics) also deserve press
attention. Second, praise and criticism must be merited. Honesty, in this regard,
separates praise from propaganda.

TikTok Wars
In fall 2021, schools across the United States experienced a wave of vandalism
inspired by “devious licks,” a TikTok “challenge” that encouraged students to
steal from—or destroy—bathrooms and post videos of the results.42 During
the week of September 13–17, for example, the school resource officer for
Hempfield School District in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, made six arrests and
questioned numerous students in connection with extensive bathroom vandalism.43
The “devious licks” episode is a warning that TikTok can quickly spread influential
messages with destructive consequences. The Russian invasion of Ukraine
provided evidence of TikTok’s influence in military affairs. As the Washington Post
noted, “TikTok videos offered some of the first glimpses of the Russian invasion,
and since then the platform has been a primary outlet for spreading news [of
39. George S. Patton Jr., War As I Knew It (New York: Bantam Books, 1947), 139.
40. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 566.
41. Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
2007), 547, 550; and William M. Leary, ed., We Shall Return! MacArthur’s Commanders and the Defeat of
Japan 1942–1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), ix–x.
42. Megan Marples, “The ‘Devious Licks’ TikTok Challenge Has Students Stealing Toilets and
Vandalizing Bathrooms,” CNN (website), September 18, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/18/health
/devious-licks-tiktok-challenge-wellness/index.html.
43. Tim Marks, telephone interview by author, March 17, 2022.
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the war] to the masses abroad.”44 Some commentators even began labeling the
conflict a “TikTok war.”45 As of this writing, the role TikTok will play in warfare
is unclear, but a few preliminary results are apparent.
TikTok poses a much more serious challenge than other social media sites
because it is not a “social media” app. Instead of connecting people, TikTok
tailors content to individual users by employing an algorithm that attempts to
find out what the consumer wants to see.46 When a user scrolls through a line
of short films, the algorithm notes how long the viewer lingers on a video and
begins showing similar content. A Wall Street Journal investigation found these
suggestions led users down “rabbit holes, which are hard to escape.”47 Hence,
it is difficult for a consumer to stop using TikTok because it is designed to
release dopamine. University of Southern California Professor Julie Albright
compares this effect to playing slot machines.48 Finally, TikTok operates out of
an authoritarian state with a record of human rights violations and an adversarial
relationship with the United States. In other words, an addictive information
site created in China feeds tailored content to users around the globe.
So far, the use of TikTok in warfare suggests it is the latest technological
innovation for news to influence conflict. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky, a former comedian, skillfully used the platform to connect with his
people and the world. He also used TikTok to speak to the enemy, encouraging
the Russian people to end the invasion.49 His success was demonstrated when
Russia enacted a “fake news” law. The law punished anyone knowingly
propagating false information with years in prison, levied hefty fines, and
drastically limiting news from outside countries.50 Meanwhile, the White House
briefed 30 TikTok “influencers”—one as young as 18 years old—on the war in
Ukraine. “Saturday Night Live” quickly produced a skit ridiculing the meeting,
44. Taylor Lorenz, “The White House Is Briefing TikTok Stars about the War in Ukraine,”
Washington Post (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/tiktok-ukraine-white-house/.
45. Kyle Chayka, “Watching the World’s ‘First TikTok War,’ ” New Yorker (website), March 3, 2022, https://
www.newyorker.com/culture/infinite-scroll/watching-the-worlds-first-tiktok-war; and Kaitlyn Tiffany,
“The Myth of the ‘First TikTok War,’” Atlantic (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2022/03/tiktok-war-ukraine-russia/627017/.
46. Fergus Ryan, “TikTok Algorithm: Why It Isn’t Really A Social Media App,” Vision of
Humanity (website), n.d., accessed March 17, 2022, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/why-tiktok-isnt
-really-a-social-media-app/; and Senate of Commonwealth of Australia, Select Committee on Foreign
Interference through Social Media, September 25, 2020, 10.
47. Wall Street Journal Staff, “Inside TikTok’s Algorithm: A WSJ Video Investigation,” Wall Street Journal
(website), July 21, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-algorithm-video-investigation-11626877477.
48. John Koetsier, “Digital Crack Cocaine: The Science behind TikTok’s Success,” Forbes (website),
January 18, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/01/18/digital-crack-cocaine-the-sciencebehind-tiktoks-success/?sh=2ad508f578be.
49. Chayka, “Watching the World’s ‘First TikTok War,’” New Yorker, March 3, 2022.
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Law, Blocks Facebook,” Wall Street Journal (website), March 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia
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but the influencers did not appear surprised. The Washington Post quoted Kahlil
Greene who explained his “generation gets all our information from TikTok.”51

No Such Thing as a “Noble Lie”
Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels was deservedly called the “father
of lies” by the Allies.52 Yet, his diaries suggest Goebbels understood spreading
misinformation as news was a position of weakness.53 For example, when the
Japanese began to refer to their defeats as “successful evacuations,” Goebbels
fumed that such obvious lies made the Axis a “laughing stock.”54 For their part,
the Japanese militarists also understood the need for honesty. After Pearl Harbor,
for example, the Japanese government publicly admitted they had lost all
the midget submarines involved in the attack. As Admiral Matome Ugaki
reasoned, “Since the Washington press reported” the story, “Japan could not but
announce it.”55 While the Axis nations habitually lied in their press and
propaganda, they also knew lying had its limits.
Radio made it easy for combatants to listen to the other side’s news. To
avoid looking foolish, news and propaganda had to be kept close to reality.
During the war, US General Robert Eichelberger wrote, “I listened to one of
their [Tokyo Radio] broadcasts and it is comparatively conservative. Noting
they knew their enemy was listening he observed, “I guess they try not to let it
sound foolish, although of course they present an improper picture.”56 While the
press of the Western Allied democracies was freer and more honest than the Axis,
technology also made the US government release information that it otherwise
would have kept secret. As Professor Steven Casey notes, when the American
government refused to release casualty figures, Allied news outlets reported
Axis claims.57 After the Battle of the Coral Sea, for example, the US Navy was
reluctant to release any information about the battle. When the Japanese began
falsely claiming a great victory with high Allied losses, MacArthur felt obliged to
release accurate information to refute the enemy propaganda.58
51. Lorenz, “Briefing TikTok Stars.”
52. David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1993), 308.
53. Louis P. Lochner, trans., The Goebbels Diaries: 1942–1943 (Garden City, NY: 1948), 239, 457, 458.
54. Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, 461.
55. Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945, ed. Donald M.
Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, trans. Masataka Chihaya (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991),
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56. Robert Eichelberger, Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger’s War in the Pacific, 1942–1945, ed. Jay Luvaas
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972), 96.
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New technologies have made deception more difficult, but truthful news—
news reporting that accurately depicts events—has a power that defies human
invention.59 Goebbels’s and Ugaki’s statements tacitly acknowledged truth’s power,
even if they understood it was a weapon they could not employ. Lying to the
public may yield short-term gains, but it comes at significant risk. For example,
in the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon Bonaparte learned the Prussians were
advancing to assist the Duke of Wellington’s troops. Nevertheless, he ordered
the story spread that French Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy was arriving with
reinforcements. Napoleon’s soldiers believed him until defeat arrived, along with
reality. It was enough to shatter French morale and turn defeat into a rout.60
Deceiving the enemy is an important and legitimate part of warfare. The
media can help fool the enemy, as the examples at the opening of this article
demonstrated. As the journalists Patton spoke to understood fully, he was not
trying to deceive them, his soldiers, or the Allied public. Today’s media is not
the World War II press corps, and commanders should use media deception
with extreme caution. Deceiving the enemy is necessary, but lying to one’s side
is dangerous.

Lessons Learned
Have new media technologies made the lessons from World War II
military-press relations obsolete? As of this writing, the war in Ukraine is still
raging, meaning any lessons drawn from the conflict must deal with incomplete
information. Nevertheless, the war has clearly shown that the media is still
a weapon in modern warfare, and new technologies have increased the media’s
power. As noted, Zelensky has brilliantly used TikTok to build support for
Ukraine.61 Not since Churchill has a leader exploited media technology to
link himself closely to resistance in a desperate cause. As evidenced by Russia’s
persistent efforts to kill him, Zelensky has succeeded in placing himself at the
center of gravity for Ukrainian endurance.62 Making one person the focal point
of resistance is dangerous; it leaves a vacuum if that person is killed. This
technique, however, has served the Ukrainian cause well.
Zelensky is not the only Ukrainian using social media. Thousands of ordinary
Ukrainians have uploaded videos and posts to Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and
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Twitter, giving the war immediacy to those watching thousands of miles away.63
Studies have also found disinformation on social media sites and TikTok.64
Persistent efforts to root out misinformation suggest the importance of truth in
warfare has not ended.65
Commanders and policymakers should mentally prepare for making difficult
decisions that might counter editorial or public opinion. They should remember
social media and Twitter storms do not necessarily represent popular sentiment
and realize they are more knowledgeable about events than stateside critics.
They must also resist the temptation to remove competent subordinates to satisfy
public opinion.
Commanders and policymakers should resist any attempts at prepublication
censorship. Nazi Germany tried to stop BBC radio broadcasts in World War II
and failed.66 Russia’s repeated unsuccessful efforts to block Western social media
in Ukraine indicate modern Internet censorship will be ineffective.67 Instead,
journalists should be accredited or embedded with units and provided guidelines
on what they cannot publish—and removed from their assignments if they
violate the guidelines. Criticism, and even disinformation, should not be silenced.
Opposition opinion in the United States was not restricted during World War II,
and this policy should continue in future wars.
Likewise, commanders must be honest with the press. Within the limits of
operational security and with an understanding that deception is part of warfare,
commanders should avoid lying to the media. Recently, there has been much
discussion of “fake news,” disinformation, or misinformation. The cure for such
problems is trust in institutions built on their personnel being honest. Even when
it is distasteful, humans want the truth, and honest commanders will serve their
country better than liars.
Nor is bad news necessarily detrimental when it comes to public relations.
Military leadership during World War II worried that if the press were too optimistic,
Americans would believe the conflict was almost won and lose interest. This
belief led to the release of photographs of dead American soldiers during the
63. Kate Linthicum, “TikTok and Twitter Capture Ukraine War in Frighteningly Real Time,”
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-rutube-inside-russias-influence-campaign-11650447002?msclkid=74bdd15bcd6311ec867c81e121a00d8c.

Lessons from History

Lovelace 131

middle of the war.68 Negative news stories can keep the civilian population from
taking victory for granted in long conflicts.
During a war, all commanders should direct media attention toward
their subordinates. Most importantly, the military should provide access to
ordinary soldiers and encourage journalists to write about them. These types of
stories make exciting news and will improve military morale. Although local
newspapers are less relevant today than during World War II, the Internet
has opened new avenues to reach audiences. Business and nonprofit organizations
have long used Facebook groups, Patreon, YouTube, and other social media to
connect with specific audiences by following the day-to-day lives of individuals
in pursuit of a particular goal. The military can do the same to highlight the
accomplishments of units and soldiers.
Finally, these conclusions are the result of an academic historical study.
They come from the past, but practitioners must be careful how they are
applied in the present. If they are tested in future wars and found wanting,
they must be discarded. Military leaders should remember that orchestrated
violence wins wars, not media strategies. The press is simply one weapon in the
arsenal of modern warfare.

Conclusion
Just as today, World War II military leaders sometimes viewed a free press
as a liability. “It’s one of the disadvantages of democracy that it can’t conduct
politics or war according to logic and intelligence,” smirked Goebbels, “but
have to respond to the up-and-down swings of public opinion.”69 Marshall worried
over the same issue. After the war he recalled, “the leader in a democracy has to
keep the people entertained.”70
Despite the annoyance and danger the press can cause the military during
a war, this article has argued that a free press is a powerful weapon in modern
warfare. Like all weapons, the media should be used and understood carefully.
Commanders, unduly influenced by public opinion—or what they believe
to be public opinion—may make unwise battlefield decisions. The Media
Offensive provides a deeper exploration of these topics; however, this article has
briefly outlined some lessons from the book that may be helpful. Studying the
68. George H. Roeder Jr., The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War Two
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 1.
69. Entry 21.7.1942, Joseph Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, ed. Elke Fröhlich
(Munich: K. G. Saur, 1995), Teil II, Brand, 160, quoted in Nigel Hamilton, The Mantle of Command:
FDR at War 1941–1942 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 317–18.
70. Larry I. Bland, ed., George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue, 3rd ed.
(Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), 622.
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military-press relationship during World War II provides excellent intellectual
training for anyone considering the possible and probable challenges the press will
pose in future conflicts.
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